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Book Reviews 
BROTHER, CAN YOU PARADIGM? 
REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE 
OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Jed 
Rubenfeld. 1 Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 2005. 
Pp. ix + 241. $39.95. 
Brannon P. Denning2 
INTRODUCTION 
Jed Rubenfeld's Revolution by Judiciary is an ambitious 
search for a way out of the reductionist debate between 
originalism and non-originalist interpretive theories that has 
dominated constitutional theory since at least the mid-twentieth 
century. Building on "commitmentarianism," a theory of 
constitutionalism introduced in his previous book Freedom and 
Time/ Rubenfeld argues that there is a structure to American 
constitutional law-a structure that, once understood, reveals 
more harmony than cacophony in much of constitutional doc-
trine. 
This hidden structure can be accessed through what 
Rubenfeld calls the "paradigm-case" method of constitutional 
interpretation. Rubenfeld argues that all constitutional text is 
derived from historic paradigm cases. The text embodies consti-
1. Robert R. Slaughter Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
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Hubbard, Trevor Jones, Dustin Kittel, Miles McGrane, and Thomas Richie-for many 
helpful comments on and criticisms of earlier drafts. 
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tutional "commitments" made by the Framers, which bind sub-
sequent generations. Judges then derive Application Under-
standings from those paradigm cases, which reflect the irreduci-
ble minimum substantive content of the textual commitment 
(pp. 12-18). In other words, if the Constitution guarantees right R, 
then the Application Understanding of R reflects what R, at a 
minimum, prohibits the government from doing. Likewise, the 
Application Understanding of constitutional power P reflects 
what, at a minimum, the Constitution permits the branch exercis-
ing that power to do. 
But Rubenfeld makes clear that his paradigm-case method 
is not repackaged originalism. There may be other contempora-
neous understandings about what the text did or didn't permit or 
prohibit, but, he argues, these are mere "intentions" that do not 
rise to the level of a commitment, which may form and be 
sloughed off by courts as the years go on. These intentions he 
terms No-Application Understandings (pp. 99-103). 
Rubenfeld makes both normative and descriptive claims for 
the paradigm-case method. Normatively, Rubenfeld argues that 
constitutional law should respect past commitments by 
grounding decisions in paradigm cases and their Application 
Understandings. At the same time, by seeking and preserving 
only the core commitments, the paradigm-case method, he 
argues, avoids the stultifying effects of originalist interpretive 
theories in which the intentions of the framers regarding 
constitutional text exhaust the content of those textual 
provisions (pp. 109-19). The mark of a true constitutional 
commitment, Rubenfeld argues, is that it is made without 
knowing quite what the commitment will ultimately entail.4 
(pp. 79-84). 
Descriptively, he argues that the Court has instinctively 
hewed to these core commitments throughout its history and 
that his theory holds the key to resolving many so-called hard 
cases that plague American constitutional doctrine-everything 
from Brown v. Board of Education5 to takings clause cases 
(pp. 20-47). Recent cases on issues like gay rights and affirma-
tive action would be more defensible, and less controversial, he 
argues, were the Court to adopt explicitly the method he finds 
implicit in its enduring decisions (pp. 184-201). Further, because 
4. See pp. 79-84 (discussing JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN 
RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000)). 
5 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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the Court has instinctively adopted it, Rubenfeld maintains that 
the paradigm-case method can be applied prospectively without 
upsetting settled doctrine (pp. 15-18). 
If it is indeed possible to identify, interpret, and apply the 
paradigm cases and Application Understandings, then 
Rubenfeld's theory would be extremely appealing. Ultimately, 
however, I find the paradigm-case method flawed. In too many 
crucial places, Rubenfeld has left too many questions about his 
interpretive method unanswered. 
Part II will summarize Rubenfeld's paradigm-case method. 
Part III outlines my objections to his interpretive method: First, 
he furnishes no criteria for correctly identifying and interpreting 
historic paradigm cases; second, the process for constructing 
Application Understandings from these paradigm cases is ob-
scure, neither instructing how to choose among plausible, con-
tending Application Understandings nor explaining the rule that 
precedent should play in their construction or application; fi-
nally, Rubenfeld offers little sense how the paradigm-case 
method operates to aid in the prospective resolution of constitu-
tional cases. A brief conclusion follows in Part IV. 
This review begins, however, with the distinction between 
"commitments" and "intentions" developed in Rubenfeld's ear-
lier work.6 Part I will summarize his theory of "commitmentari-
anism" and tie it to the paradigm-case method described in more 
detail in Part II. 
I. COMMITMENTS VERSUS INTENTIONS 
Rubenfeld argues throughout the first part of Revolution by 
Judiciary that Application Understandings reflect specific consti-
tutional commitments informed by paradigm historical cases and 
enshrined in the Constitution's text. He juxtaposes these para-
digm cases and the resulting Application Understandings that 
arise from them against mere "intentions" reflected in No-
Application Understandings, which, in contrast to the Applica-
tion Understandings, judges are free to discard over time. The 
second third of his book, drawing on Freedom and Time, ex-
plains and defends this distinction, which Rubenfeld argues 
separates paradigm-case interpretive method from both original-
ism and non-originalist interpretations of the Constitution. The 
argument he offers is complex; what follows is, of necessity, only 
6. RUBENFELD, supra note 3. 
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a brief summary of his defense, which, itself, is a summary of his 
earlier book. Nevertheless, I begin here, in media res, because 
understanding comrnitmentarianism is key to understanding the 
distinction between Application and No-Application Under-
standings. 
According to "commitmentarianism," a present-day politi-
cal community is bound by commitments made in the past be-
cause self-governance is a temporally-extended process of mak-
ing commitments and being bound by them after the committing 
generation has passed (pp. 96-98). The obligation to honor those 
commitments separates the paradigm case method from non-
originalist modes of interpretation. But Rubenfeld's method is 
also different from originalism because it enforces only those 
special obligations that rise to the level of a constitutional com-
mitment-the intentions of the framers count for nothing be-
cause they could not have foreseen what the commitments they 
made might ultimately entail. 
"Commitments," he writes, "create-or seem to create-
obligation. Mere intentions do not" (p. 73). Thus, when one 
commits to another, or to oneself, that action, according to 
Rubenfeld, signifies a level of obligation that merely intending to 
do something does not. "To commit oneself is to engage in a 
special normative operation that goes beyond intending, through 
which one imposes obligations on oneself over time" (p. 99). 
Further, that obligation is recognized as valid and binding at 
some point in the future, even when the immediate preference is 
to do something else. 7 
Our political commitments are reflected in our written Con-
stitution. Creating commitments and obligations over time, 
Rubenfeld believes, is what constitutes real political freedom-
undertaking the actions of self-government that owe duties to 
the past even as we constantly look to the future. "We live com-
mitted lives," he writes; one facet of the committed life is self-
government, which "requires a practice of making and keeping 
commitments" (p. 89). Constitution-making is simply this idea of 
self-government writ large, with entire communities makin~ and 
obeying commitments, even commitments made in the past. For 
7. Seep. 73 ("An agent makes a commitment precisely in order to lay an obliga-
tion on himself, and this obligation is supposed to govern his future conduct even in the 
face of a later contrary preference."). 
8. P. 96: 
American constitutionalism is a practice through which a democratic nation 
seeks to govern itself by making and living up to its own enduring commitments, 
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Rubenfeld, this free choice to commit, and then obey those 
commitments over time, constitutes true autonomy.9 As he puts 
it later in the work: 
Understanding American constitutionalism, both descrip-
tively and normatively, requires us to embrace a temporally 
extended picture of self-government. This idea of self-
government over time in turn implies a central place for 
commitments. Rejecting the presentist conception of self-
government means that democracy does not consist ideally of 
governance by present democratic will, but also, in fundamen-
tal part, of adhering to the nation's fundamental, self-given 
commitments over time. Only this commitment-based account 
of constitutional democracy explains the Constitution's con-
tinuing authority today. That is why commitmentarianism is 
the right lens through which to read the Constitution 
(p. 112). 10 
The distinction between commitments and intentions oper-
ates in the realm of constitutional interpretation as well, for 
Rubenfeld invokes this dichotomy to justify his distinction be-
tween Application and No-Application Understandings. The lat-
ter "are never commitments" and thus may be freely ignored by 
judges interpreting constitutional provisions (p. 99). Application 
Understandings, on the other hand, represent the concrete fact 
situations that gave rise to the obligations reflected in the Con-
even in the face of contrary majority preferences at one moment or another. 
Our constitutionalism ... stands for a form of democracy that rejects presen-
tism. 
9. P. 91: 
(A] person's freedom ... is bound up with his capacity to give his life purposes 
of his own making and to pursue those purposes over time. This freedom is 
called autonomy or self-governance. A self-governing agent does not act merely 
on his present preferences. He will have given himself his own ends and held 
himself to those ends over time. 
10. This notion of constitutional democracy as a temporally-extended project where 
the past restrains, to some extent, the wishes of present majorities, is why Rubenfeld 
finds the "dead hand" argument unavailing. "On the temporally extended conception of 
self-government," he writes in response to the argument that the Framers, being dead, 
cannot commit anyone to anything, "one way a nation gives itself law is by making con-
stitutional commitments in the past and holding itself to them over time." (p. 135). Re-
jecting the commitments the Framers made, and to which we are presently committed, he 
continues, would require "replac(ing] the rejected constitutional commitments with 
other, enduring commitments, which would in turn exert authority over the next genera-
tion of Americans, after we had died, unless and until they rejected them." (p. 141 ). 
While an "earth belongs to the living" approach to government may be better than the 
cornrnitmentarian scheme he favors, Rubenfeld suggests, by way of confession and 
avoidance, that "those who argue for government by present popular will have stepped 
outside the enterprise of self-government embraced by American constitutionalism for 
the last two hundred years." (p. 141). 
86 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 23:81 
stitution in the first place; thus, they should command the re-
spect of judges, who should honor those commitments despite 
strong majoritarian sentiment to disregard them (p. 99). 
To understand precisely how this works, consider 
Rubenfeld's example of the Fourteenth Amendment. The con-
sensus, while by no means universal,11 is that the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not understand that Amendment to 
require the immediate desegregation of public schools. 12 There 
is, however, nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment that speaks 
to the question of public school segregation; rather, the language 
of that Amendment both guarantees "privileges or immunities" 
against state interference and enjoins states to extend "equal 
protection of the laws" to all persons within their jurisdiction. 13 
For Rubenfeld, the latter guarantees are the commitment; the 
former understanding that segregation would not be affected-
however important to the ratification of the Amendment it 
might have been-was a mere No-Application Understanding 
that the Amendment did not require desegregation of public 
schools and was subject to being discarded at some point in the 
future. It did not, he stresses, commit states or judges to the con-
tinued segregation of schools (pp. 43-46). 
As he explains, a "prohibition against x, understood not to 
apply toy, implies no commitment to doing y" (p. 100). Nor does 
it even imply "a commitment to the permissibility of y" because 
it is not a commitment of any sort (p. 100). "No-Application 
Understandings, even of commitments, are not themselves 
commitments. They are, precisely, understandings of what the 
agent has not committed himself to, so far as this commitment is 
concerned. They reflect ... at most, an intention not to be com-
mitted" (p. 101). Commitments to do something, or to allow 
something to be done-like requiring the segregation of public 
schools or permitting states to maintain segregated systems-
could be made, but to be regarded as "commitments," they 
would need to be made explicit in the Constitution (p. 103). 
Similarly, he holds that assurances given about the scope of 
a commitment's applicability-think, for example, about the as-
surances given that ratifying the Equal Rights Amendment 
11. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 
81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995). 
12. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Desegrega-
tion Decisions, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955). Note that Bickel concluded that the Framers 
might not have intended to entrench segregation forever either. /d. at 61--{i3. 
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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would not lead ineluctably to gay marriage, unisex bathrooms, 
and the like-also count for naught because they are not com-
mitments either (pp. 102, 104). The inability to limit commit-
ments ex ante, he says, makes his "commitmentarian" approach 
different than originalism. "Originalism requires adherence, to 
the greatest possible extent, to all the 'founding' intentions. 
Commitment-based interpretation, by contrast, has no special 
regard for the original No-Application intentions, which were 
not commitments" (p. 106). 
Application Understandings, on the other hand, represent 
commitments because "the agent centrally intends to be impos-
ing on himself an obligation not to engage in some specific 
course of action by committing himself to a more general prohi-
bition (of which the specific course of action is the definitive, 
paradigmatic instance)-the Application Understanding is itself 
a commitment" (p. 117). As it happens, there were specific, 
paradigm applications of the general prohibitions and powers 
detailed in the Constitution (p. 119). "Where the Constitution's 
commitments have core paradigm cases, they require precisely 
the interpretive asymmetry observed throughout constitutional 
doctrine. The foundational Application Understandings bind be-
cause they are themselves commitments, even while the No-
Application Understandings can be cast aside" (p. 119). This 
holds true even if the original Application Understanding turns 
out to be mistaken (p. 129). 
Rubenfeld's distinction between intentions and commit-
ments is central to his theorr That distinction will not, however, 
be the focus of my critique.1 I will focus instead on the problems 
arising from any attempt to employ Rubenfeld's paradigm-case 
method in constitutional interpretation. These difficulties, I ar-
gue in Part III, mean not only that Rubenfeld's theory fails to 
avoid the problems of either originalism or another non-
originalist approach to interpretation, but in fact may combine 
the worst features of both. The next Part, however, describes the 
paradigm-case method in more detail. 
14. For critical appraisals of Freedom and Time, where Rubenfeld discussed his dis-
tinction in more detail, see Erwin Chemerinsky, A Grand Theory of Constitutional Law? 
100 MICH. L. REV. 1249 (2002) (book review); Michael J. Gerhardt, The End of Theory, 
96 Nw. U. L. REV. 283 (2001) (book review). A more positive review can be found in 
L.H. LaRue, The Self That Governs, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 225 (2002) (book review). The 
Fordham Law Review also sponsored a symposium on Rubenfeld's book, along with 
Christopher Eisgruber's book Constitutional Self-Government. See Symposium, Theories 
of Constitutional Self-Government, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 1721 (2003). 
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II. UNCOVERING THE CONSTITUTION'S 
"KILLER APPS" 
"Reasoning from paradigm cases," Rubenfeld writes, "is the 
primary business of constitutional interpretation" (p. 16). While 
paradigm shifts occur when "judges periodically tear down the 
interpretive paradigms they have constructed, replacing them 
with new ones . . . constitutional law retains its fundamental 
structure: it remains organized around historical Application 
Understandings, while No-Application Understandings are left 
behind" (p. 17). 15 Rubenfeld's project is to produce criteria by 
which constitutional paradigm shifts may be evaluated (p. 17). 
"Judges who engage in radical reinterpretation of the Constitu-
tion must still answer to the Constitution's foundational para-
digm cases. The new doctrine labors under the continuing obli-
gation to do justice to the paradigm cases-or, more precisely, to 
do justice to the text in light of its paradigm cases" (p. 17). Un-
derstanding the role that these paradigm cases play in constitu-
tional law is the key, argues Rubenfeld, to explaining what ap-
pears at first glance to be doctrinal incoherence and to justifying 
some of constitutional law's hardest cases, like Brown. 16 
The Application Understanding of a constitutional right re-
flects "specific understandings of what a constitutional right pro-
hibits" (p. 14). Conversely, a No-Application Understanding is 
what the constitutional provision does not (at least explicitly) 
prohibit (p. 14). In discussions of constitutional powers, Applica-
tion Understanding refer to what the power was understood to 
permit. No-Application Understandings, on the other hand, refer 
to "original understandings of what a particular Article I power 
did not authorize Congress to do" (p. 49). Rubenfeld claims that 
"where constitutional doctrine has departed from important his-
torical understandings, it has virtually always departed" from 
No-Application Understandings (p. 13). 
One of the challenges of Revolution by Judiciary is the 
opaque terminology Rubenfeld employs to describe his con-
15. Later, Rubenfeld makes clear what is suggested here: Reasoning outward from 
paradigm cases follows the conventional common law model of legal reasoning. See p. 43 
(noting that reasoning from paradigm cases "exerts a kind of hydraulic normative force. 
It pushes outward, in the familiar common-law style, available for the next set of plain-
tiffs as a basis for argument. Paradigm-case reasoning is common-law reasoning; it is the 
font of constitutional law's common-law-ishness."). 
16. P. 18 ("Once we see the fundamental structure of constitutional interpretation, 
the revolutionary holding in a case like Brown will no longer seem difficult to justify as a 
matter of interpretation."). 
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cepts. Fortunately, he does provide specific case studies attempt-
ing to illustrate paradigm cases and Application Understandings 
of particular constitutional rights and powers. Below, I have 
highlighted a few of the doctrinal areas Rubenfeld uses both to 
illustrate the paradigm-case method and to bolster his argument 
that the method reflects what the Supreme Court already does, 
at least implicitly. Free speech, takings, and equal protection are 
discussed first, followed by an application of the paradigm-case 
method to the commerce clause and to separation of powers 
questions. 
A. RIGHTS 
1. Free Speech-Given the variety of things that it protects, 
from profanity and pornography to nude dancing and flag burn-
ing, "contemporary free-speech law spurns a vast range of origi-
nal No-Application Understandings" (p. 21). In other words, no 
one would have understood the First Amendment to prohibit 
governmental regulation of much of what it now protects. Two 
Application Understandings-derived from historic events that 
served as paradigm cases-are, however, still a part of First 
Amendment doctrine: the ban on prior restraints and a ban on 
prosecutions for "seditious libel" -for criticizing the government 
or its officials (pp. 21-23). Not only have these two core applica-
tions remained, the Court has relied on both as justification for 
its strict scrutiny of content-based regulations of speech. 
Rubenfeld explains: 
The concept of prior restraint was limited to laws that restrain 
speech before utterance, but it had no inherent subject-matter 
limitation (it was not limited, for example, to political 
speech). The prohibition of sedition laws stretched beyond 
prior restraint, but it was limited by subject matter (applying 
only to speech criticizing government officials or policy). 
When, however, these two paradigm cases are put together, 
the First Amendment can become a bulwark against all state 
efforts to impose orthodoxies on individuals' opinions, re-
gardless of the subject matter and regardless of whether the 
restrictions apply before or after the speech has been uttered 
(p. 27). 
Thus reinterpreted, there followed "a revolutionary shift in 
free-speech law," opening protection of all sorts of speech not 
deemed protected at the time of the First Amendment's ratifica-
tion (p. 28). While "modern freedom of speech cannot be recon-
ciled with the original No-Application Understandings" it "ad-
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heres to and builds on the historical Application Understand-
ings" (p. 29). 
2. Takings- Rubenfeld argues that his theory is particularly 
helpful when one considers an area of law, like takings, that "is 
often said to be so confused that [it] is almost unintelligible" 
(p. 35). For example, the Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 17 which set the Court down the path of "regula-
tory takings," inaugurated a particularly troublesome line of 
doctrine (p. 35). 18 But as Rubenfeld notes, "takings law routinely 
allows government to destroy the economic value of people's 
property without compensating them" (p. 36), while in other 
cases a regulation that destroys the economic value of property 
will be held to be a taking requiring compensation. Familiar ex-
amples from the case law in which compensation is not owed in-
clude grohibition laws that destroy the value of a brewery or dis-
tillery 9 and destruction of diseased trees to protect healthy trees 
nearby?0 What is the difference between those uncompensated 
regulatory actions and the Pennsylvania law in Mahon, requiring 
coal companies to mine so as not to cause subsidence to adjacent 
property owners, which, the Court held, went too far? 
According to Rubenfeld, sorting out Application and No-
Application Understandings is key to understanding the doctrine. 
It was well-understood at the time of the Framing that govern-
ment confiscation of one's property for use by the ~ublic (the 
eminent domain power) required just compensation. 1 Eminent 
domain, in other words, served as the paradigm case informing 
the takings clause. On the other hand, "land-use regulations or 
other governmental actions that did not involve" actual expro-
priation or physical possession of the land were No-Application 
Understandings (p. 38). While this means that modern regulatory 
takings law is inconsistent with a No-Application Understanding, 
it is consistent with the Application Understanding. 
The takings clause requires not merely that the private 
property be taken, but that it be taken for public use. 
17. 260 u.s. 393 (1922). 
18. P. 35 ("Pennsylvania Coal was one of the first Supreme Court cases to find a 
'regulatory taking' -to find, in other words, that a mere regulation of property amounted 
to a taking. The difficulty ever since has been to say what it means for a regulation of 
property to go 'too far."'). 
19. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) 
20. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928). 
21. P. 38 ("From the beginning and still today, the one clear, unquestioned applica-
tion of the takings clause is that it requires compensation when the government exercises 
its eminent domain power."). 
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In traditional cases of eminent domain there is always both a 
taking and a using. The government takes over someone's 
land or chattel and impresses it into specific, state-directed 
use .... But as property regulations became more complex 
and pervasive, it became possible for government to accom-
plish an eminent domain result ... under the rubric of mere 
regulation (p. 39). 
91 
In Pennsylvania Coal, there was not merely the usual prohibition 
of certain activities that is the hallmark of land use regulation; 
Pennsylvania's regulation "require[ d] owners of underground 
real estate to leave pillars of land intact, in order to support 
buildings, streets, or other structures overhead" (p. 39). This dis-
tinguishes it from other regulations that "merely deprive[] peo-
ple of property or property value, but do[] not impress property 
into a specific use" (p. 39). Cases in which compensation has 
been ordered by the Court, Rubenfeld argues, involve "both a 
taking and a using" (p. 40). Thus, "[t]he Court has identified a 
distinguishing feature of the takings clause's foundational appli-
cations-the element of a using, definitive of the eminent do-
main power-and built modern doctrine around it" (p. 40). 
3. Equal Protection-By now the pattern should be clear, 
but let me discuss one more example. For Rubenfeld, the resort 
to Application and No-Application Understandings provides a 
useful tool for explaining why Brown is an easy case. The classic 
paradigm case that informed the framing of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the proliferation of the so-called "Black 
Codes," which sought to keep a form of de facto slavery in tact in 
southern states following Emancipation.22 Even a thoroughgoing 
originalist like Raoul Berger agreed. 23 "The struggle to abolish 
these black codes was famously central to, and definitive of, the 
act of constitution-writing that became the Fourteenth Amend-
ment" (p. 41). The Supreme Court itself affirmed this under-
standing in both the Slaughter-House Casei4 and in Strauder v. 
22. P. 41 ("In 1865, the Southern states began promulgating laws singling out blacks 
for unequal treatment in matters of labor, land ownership, criminal penalties, and so 
on."). For a description and an account of the origins of the "Black Codes," see ERIC 
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 198-
201 & 208--D9 (1st ed. 1988); 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF 
LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 440-41 (2d ed. 2002). 
23. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 19 (1977) (arguing that the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment "meant to secure familiar, 'fundamental rights,' and only those, and 
to guard them as of yore against deprivation except by (1) a nondiscriminatory law, and 
(2) the established judicial procedure of the State."). 
24. 83 u.s. 36 (1873). 
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West Virginia, where it struck down state attempts to keep 
blacks from serving on juries.25 
But nineteenth century rights talk distinguished among civil, 
political, and social rights.Z6 While blacks were to be afforded 
equal "civil" rights, few at the time thought that the Fourteenth 
Amendment addressed issues like equal political rights (such as 
voting, which wouldn't be addressed until the ratification of the 
Fifteenth Amendment) and social rights, which included the 
right to mix freely with whites. Few Framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would have regarded their support of the Amend-
ment as incongruous with support of segregated schools, which 
involved social, not civil rights. Plessy v. Ferguson's notorious 
approval of laws enforcing a "separate but equal" existence on 
the country's African-American citizens is a stark reminder how 
ingrained this distinction was. 
For Rubenfeld, however, that trichotomy of rights, the ap-
proval of segregated schools, and "separate but equal" were all 
No-Application Understandings that Brown was free to disre-
gard in 1954 when it announced an end to state-mandated segre-
gation in schools (p. 46). However jarring this break with the 
past was to contemporary observers, Rubenfeld argues that be-
cause Brown kept faith with the Application Understandings of 
the Amendment, the rest was constitutional chaff. 
The key, he argues, is Strauder. Not only did the Court 
strike down the prohibition on black jury service, but in doing 
so, the Court argued that their exclusion marked them with a 
badge of inferiority- the sort of badge affixed by the Black 
Codes, which the Amendment was intended to remove. 
"Through an interpretation of the black codes, the Court derived 
a principle according to which 'legal discriminations' against 
blacks 'assert[ing] their inferiority' or 'implying their inferiority 
in civil society' were unconstitutional" (p. 43). 
Though modest, he argues that Strauder was also potentially 
transformative: "[T]here is no difficulty in seeing Brown as an 
elaboration on-indeed an application of-Strauder's anti-
inferiorization principle" (p. 43). Brown kept faith with the 
original Application Understandings, as articulated by Strauder; 
Plessy held with the No-Application Understandings embodied 
25. 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
26. For an explanation of this division, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 
(1896) (distinguishing between political and social rights); McConnell, supra note 11, at 
1014-23. 
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in the tripartite classification of rights. Brown is now regarded as 
iconic, as a "super-precedent" not susceptible to overruling; 
Plessy, on the other hand, is derided (pp. 44-45).27 
B. POWERS 
1. The Commerce Clause-Originally "the commerce clause 
did not empower Congress to regulate most manufacturing, agri-
culture, or labor relations within the several states" (p. 53), but 
after 1937 the Court's interpretation of the clause "demolish[ ed] 
earlier No-Application Understandings" (p. 53) until (perhaps 
briefly) the Court appeared to call a halt in United States v. Lo-
pei8 and United States v. Morrison. 29 The original Application 
Understandings of the clause, Rubenfeld argues were (1) to 
grant Congress authority "over all tariffs and commercial trans-
actions that crossed state or national lines" and (2) "to vest Con-
gress with the power to regulate the country's navigable waters, 
even when those waters were located within a state" (pp. 53-54). 
In particular, Congress possessed the power "to prevent obstruc-
tions to those waters," such as bridges (p. 54). 
Rubenfeld argues that the power to remove obstructions 
from waterways actually laid the groundwork for the Court's 
commerce clause revolution, embodied in cases like Wickard v. 
Filburn. 3° Critics of Wickard, he argues, ignore 
the Application Understanding of the commerce clause just 
discussed: the understanding that Congress always had power 
to regulate bridges built over navigable waters. What brought 
such a bridge within Congress's commerce power was ... the 
fact that it might substantially harm interstate commerce. If 
we ask for a general rule governing the commerce power that 
captures, as a central instance of that rule, a law regulating in-
state bridges that might obstruct interstate commerce, the rule 
cannot be that Congress may regulate only acts that them-
selves amount to interstate commerce .... A rule that would 
capture the Application Understanding is the following: "The 
power to regulate interstate commerce embraces the power to 
protect that commerce from injury whatever may be the 
source of the dangers which threaten it, and to adopt any ap-
propriate means to that end" (p. 55). 
27. Cf Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of rhe Desegregation Decisions, 69 
YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960) (stating that laughter is the only appropriate response to the 
Court's reasoning in Plessy). 
28. 514 u.s. 549 (1995). 
29. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). But see Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
30. 317 u.s. 111 (1942). 
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So understood, Wickard, although undoubtedly an expansive 
construction of the commerce clause, can still trace its roots to 
an Application Understanding (p. 55). Though in 1789 this 
power may have been understood to stop when waters ceased to 
become navigable, and not to apply on land at all, those under-
standings would have been No-Application Understandings 
(p. 56). 
2. Separation of Powers- Rubenfeld's discussion of the Ap-
plication and No-Application Understandings of separation of 
powers questions is, by his own admission, complicated and hard 
to follow. 31 He contrasts his view to the "strict separationist" 
view under which "the Constitution's legislative powers are 
granted to Congress alone, the executive powers in Article II to 
the President alone, and the judicial power to the courts alone" 
(p. 56). He notes that this view casts doubt on many aspects of 
the modern administrative state and that the text of the Consti-
tution itself provides little help in resolving these disputes be-
cause "virtually every one of the Constitution's power-granting 
provisions is grammatically ambiguous, permitting exclusive and 
nonexclusive readings" (p. 56). 
For example, he writes, "[t]he commander-in-chief 
clause ... does not say on its face that only the President may 
exercise the powers of commander in chief, but it can be read 
that way, and it always has been;" thus "[o]n this view, Congress 
could not constitutionally appoint a designated general or bu-
reaucrat to be commander in chief" (p. 56). A nonexclusive 
reading of congressional powers is also possible: "[T]he com-
merce clause could be read as exclusive-only Congress may 
regulate interstate commerce-but it is not read that way today" 
(pp. 56-57). For example, both Congress and New York can 
criminalize the transportation of cocaine into New York (p. 57). 
Older cases, Rubenfeld argues, embraced the strict separa-
tionist approach. Gradually, however, that view was replaced by 
decisions "emphasizing that the three branches can share a great 
deal of overlapping, concurrent power, with no 'hermetic' divi-
sion between them" (p. 57).32 This relaxed approach to separa-
31. P. 56 (prefacing the discussion with a warning that "only experts in this field 
may want to work their way through the complex arguments that follow"). 
32. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (upholding federal sen-
tencing commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); see also Clinton v. City of 
New Y ark, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); American Trucking 
Ass'n v. United States, 344 U.S. 298 (1953) (refusing to tighten up the non-delegation 
doctrine for administrative agencies). 
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tion of powers questions has drawn criticism from, among oth-
ers, Justice Scalia, who favors a bright-line approach. 33 Despite 
the criticism, Rubenfeld maintains that current doctrine follows 
the Application/No-Application Understandings paradigm. 
Application Understandings obtain "when a power was be-
lieved to be exclusive and ... prevent[ ed] some other actor ... 
from exercising the power in question" (p. 58). Courts are not 
free to give these provisions a nonexclusive reading at some later 
date. "If the Supreme Court today adopted a nonexclusive read-
ing of the declaration-of-war clause, under which the clause no 
longer barred the President from declaring war, the Court would 
have surrendered a foundational paradigm case" (pp. 58-59). 
The key is "ascertaining whether any core prohibitory Applica-
tion Understandings can be identified in connection with a given 
constitutional power" (p. 59). Such a core prohibitory Applica-
tion Understanding, in contrast to Congress's power to declare 
war, was not present, he argues, in the commerce clause. This 
means that "the contemporary nonexclusive reading of the 
commerce clause is consistent with paradigm-case interpreta-
tion" (p. 59). "[T]here was no foundational prohibitory Applica-
tion Understanding that requires an exclusive reading of that 
clause, and ... the clause is not read as exclusive today" (p. 59).34 
How does this resolve contemporary separation-of-powers 
controversies? The absence of prohibitory Application Under-
standings means that there is no bar to, for example, permitting 
states to exercise regulatory or taxing authority over some inter-
state commerce, authorizing executive officers to legislate, or al-
lowing courts to exercise executive powers (p. 60). "While there 
may well have been an original understanding that executive of-
ficers or judges would have no constitutional authority to make 
law, there was no constitutional commitment enacted prohibiting 
them from doing so" (p. 60). Thus, despite criticism from Justice 
Scalia and some legal scholars, neither the delegation of rule-
making authority to executive agencies nor the involvement of 
judges in the formulation of sentencing guidelines- to give two 
33. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413 (Scalia, 1., dissenting); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 
697 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Re-
flections on Mistretta, Morrison, and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 357 
(1990); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and 
Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 (1997); Symposium, Morrison v. Olson: 
Addressing the Constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Statute, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 
255 (1989). 
34. For my criticism of his conclusion here, see infra notes 40-43, 47-48 and accom-
panying text. 
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examples-violates constitutional Application Understandings, 
as Rubenfeld defines them. 
But what of the Constitution's vesting clauses, assigning re-
sponsibility for the exercise of legislative, executive, and judicial 
power with Congress, the President, and the courts, respec-
tively? If, say, executive power vested in the President was truly 
exclusive, he "would be very surprised to hear it, given that state 
officers, who are not under the President's control" (p. 61) were 
expected to execute federal laws if authorized by Congress. An-
ticipating the argument that the Constitution recognized vertical 
and horizontal separation of powers,35 Rubenfeld responds that 
while "this assertion may well be largely correct" it is not bind-
ing on judges because it was not an Application Understanding 
(p. 61). 
If strict separation was an Application Understanding, 
Rubenfeld argues, the President could not negotiate a treaty 
dealing with foreign commerce since that would conflict with Ar-
ticle l's assignment of power to regulate foreign commerce to 
Congress (pp. 62-63). 
[T)he right thing to say about the treaty power is this. It is not 
in conflict with Article I. Congress's power to regulate com-
merce with foreign states was not thought to be 'horizontally' 
exclusive. Neither that specific grant of power to Congress 
nor Article I's vesting clause as such prohibits the President 
from making a law that regulates foreign commerce ... 
(p. 63). 
He concludes that once one applies paradigm case reasoning, 
there is no categorical unconstitutionality in administrative 
agencies passing laws or adjudicating cases. Nor is there any 
categorical unconstitutionality in an independent prosecutor, 
who exercises executive authority even though Article II vests 
the President with the executive power. Nor is there any fun-
damental problem with judges participating on commissions 
that promulgate sentencing guidelines. These pieces of mod-
ern separation of powers doctrine are very difficult to recon-
cile with originalism, but not with paradigm-case interpreta-
tion. The jettisoned historical understandings are No-
Application Understandings, which are not binding (p. 66). 
35. P. 61 ("We are asked to distinguish ... between 'vertical' and 'horizontal' sepa-
ration of powers. On the original understanding, it is said, the powers assigned to the 
various branches of the federal government may not have been vertically exclusive (pro-
hibiting state actors from exercising the powers at issue), but they were horizontally ex-
clusive (prohibiting members of other branches from exercising them)."). 
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As for vertical separation of powers between the states and 
the federal government, the Constitution's delegations are non-
exclusive as well. Where the framers wished to grant exclusive 
power to the federal government, the enumeration of a particu-
lar power in, say, Article I, section 8, is followed by an explicit 
prohibition in Article I, section 10. Had there been an Applica-
tion Understanding regarding the exclusivity of congressional 
power, those restrictions would have been entirely superfluous 
(p. 59).36 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE PARADIGM CASE METHOD 
There is no denying that Rubenfeld's theory is elegant: 
Take provisions of the Constitution; decide what, in fact, they 
were intended to do by reference to historic paradigm cases; 
then reason out from those paradigm cases in the familiar com-
mon law method to apply the core Application Understanding 
prospectively. But upon close inspection, this mode of interpre-
tation reminds one of the joke about the shipwrecked economist, 
whose solution to getting at the canned food that had washed 
ashore begins, "First, assume the existence of a can opener." 
First, identifying and interpreting paradigm cases will not 
always be as straightforward as Rubenfeld would have us be-
lieve. Second, even once paradigm cases are identified, con-
structing the proper Application Understandings from them will 
again be challenging, as the same historical event could give rise 
to multiple interpretations and thus multiple Application Under-
standings. Not only does Rubenfeld fail to provide a methodol-
ogy for constructing Application Understandings, but third, he 
fails to provide, or even acknowledge the need for, guidance for 
choosing among rival Application Understandings. Fourth, there 
is the uncertain role that precedent plays in the paradigm case 
method: Do court cases become paradigm "cases"? How do 
these affect the construction and application of Application Un-
derstandings? Finally, there is little in the way of example show-
ing how the paradigm case method works prospectively. At criti-
cal junctures, Rubenfeld simply goes silent, leaving us to guess at 
the answers to these important questions. 
36. P. 59 ("Most of the powers granted to Congress in Article I were probably un-
derstood to be nonexclusive. After Article I grants Congress the power to coin money, it 
goes on to bar states from coining money. This would have been quite unnecessary if the 
granting of the power to Congress had by its own terms been understood to be exclu-
sive."). 
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A. IDENTIFYING PARADIGM CASES 
In his earlier work, Rubenfeld wrote that "the Constitu-
tion's provisions are to be understood in terms of the actual, his-
torical struggles of a particular people to lay down and live out 
its own commitments."37 He regarded these struggles as "foun-
dational paradigm cases ... [that] are nothing other than the 
core historical commitments memorialized by the act of constitu-
tion-writing in question."38 Paradigm cases, therefore, precede 
the constitutional commitment and inform it. From those para-
digm cases arise the Application Understandings that reflect the 
paradigm case and enshrine it in a constitutional commitment. 
The paradigm cases represent "a fact" about that provision's 
meaning. 39 Prevention of future trials like Zenger's represents a 
"fact" about the First Amendment's meaning (p. 23); the pres-
ence of post-Civil War Black Codes represents a "fact" about 
the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning. Both provisions, he ar-
gues, mean at least that seditious libel trials and discriminatory 
legislation depriving African-Americans of civil liberties were 
prohibited. 
But in reading his descriptions of paradigm cases, one 
quickly realizes that many occurred after a particular constitu-
tional provision was drafted. Rubenfeld says that the Zenger 
trial and the Alien and Sedition Acts are paradigm First 
Amendment cases. But if Zenger was the paradigm case and, as 
Rubenfeld argues, the Application Understanding arising there-
from was "no prosecution for seditious libel," then the fact of the 
Alien and Sedition Acts' passage, and subsequent prosecutions 
under the Acts, suggest that his account of the First Amend-
ment's Application Understanding is mistaken. Rubenfeld re-
sponds that really the election of 1800 was what made prosecu-
tions for seditious libel the paradigm cases (here, literally the 
cases brought under the Acts giving rise to the Application Un-
derstanding) (p. 24). 
Or consider his description of paradigm cases under the 
commerce clause. Rubenfeld does not linger to consider "[t]he 
most obvious historical application of the commerce clause," i.e., 
establishing "congressional authority over all tariffs and com-
mercial transactions that crossed state or national lines" and 
over "the country's navigable waters, even when those waters 
37. RUBENFELD, supra note 3, at 183. 
38. Id. at 184. 
39. Id. at 183. 
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were located within a state" (pp. 53-54). He spends the bulk of 
his discussion on another alleged paradigm case: "the under-
standing that Congress could act to prevent obstructions to 
[navigable] waters" like those posed by some bridges (p. 54). 
The Application Understanding he derives from this paradigm 
case-Congress can prevent obstructions to interstate com-
merce-he avers, "goes a long way toward exralaining and justi-
fying," among other things, Wickard v. Filburn ° (p. 54). 
In both examples, Rubenfeld cites as paradigm cases events 
occurring not prior to, or even contemporaneous with, the con-
stitutional commitments these events allegedly informed, but 
those occurring years or decades later. Whatever might be said 
about the election of 1800, it postdated the proposal and ratifica-
tion of the First Amendment and could hardly serve as a para-
digm case for that Amendment. Moreover, Rubenfeld's "pre-
venting obstructions" Application Understanding derives not 
from founding-era paradigm cases, but rather from a series of 
Marshall- and Taney-era Court cases.41 Most court cases in those 
early years interpreted the scope of the commerce clause as lim-
iting state power, not delineating the power of Congress to act. 
In one case in which the Court did address the scope of congres-
sional power, Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge, the 
Court upheld Congress's legislative judgment that a bridge pre-
viously held by the Court to unconstitutionally obstruct com-
merce was not an obstruction.42 The Wheeling Bridge case, 
though, was decided nearly seventy years after the ratification of 
the Constitution; it certainly didn't inform the debates of the 
members in Philadelphia. 
What's going on here? Rubenfeld seems to treat newly-
drafted constitutional provisions like wet cement: Before the pro-
40. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding application of wheat quota to farmer growing 
wheat for personal use). 
41. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 
518 (1852) (ordering removal of a bridge deemed to interfere with interstate commerce); 
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (concluding that 
Delaware dam was not intended to obstruct commerce, but represented valid exercise of 
state police power). 
42. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 430 
(1856) (upholding congressional declaration that bridge did not constitute obstruction to 
interstate commerce). For background on the initial determination by the Court, the 
congressional reaction, and the Court's reconsideration, see DA vm P. CURRIE, THE 
CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829-1861, at 192-94 (2005); 
CARL B. SWISHER, 5 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 408-18 (1974); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT 
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 1836-1918, at 233-36 (1926). 
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visions' meanings "set," passersby are free to leave impressions in 
the cement that will become a part of them once they dry. He sees 
"ratification" as a temporally-extended event where a window of 
time exists for paradigm cases to emerge and be, in effect, back-
dated to inform the Application Understandings arising from the 
text itself. I say "seems" because Rubenfeld provides nothing to 
explain or defend these late-arising paradiim cases and the Appli-
cation Understandings derived from them. 3 
But they need defending. Otherwise it looks as if paradigm-
case reasoning begins with where the Court is doctrinally (no 
prosecutions for seditious libel) and then reasons backwards un-
til one finds an historical event (the Jeffersonians' attacks on 
Alien and Sedition Act prosecutions) that is proximate enough 
in time to the Framing to serve as a "paradigm case" giving rise 
to an Application Understanding that reflects current doctrine. 
B. CONSTRUCfiNG APPLICATION UNDERSTANDINGS FROM 
PARADIGM CASES 
Even if there is a paradigm case-and there will often be an 
historical event that was on at least some framers' minds when 
drafting a constitutional provision-one must both interpret that 
case and then infer the correct Application Understanding from 
it or from the constitutional text spawned by the paradigm case. 
This is no small feat, especially since constitutional texts are of-
ten written in general terms. The Fourteenth Amendment, for 
example, doesn't say anything about Black Codes; it is much 
more general than, say, the Thirteenth Amendment, which 
makes it pretty clear that the eradication of slavery- by what-
ever name-is its raison d'etre.44 I will argue here that Rubenfeld 
is not particularly forthcoming about either (1) how properly to 
43. This feature of his method is reminiscent of Keith Whittington's theory of extrajudi-
cial constitutional construction. KEITH E. WHI1TINGTON, CONSfiTUTIONAL CONSTRUCf!ON: 
DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUilONAL MEANING (1999). Rubenfeld's colleague Bruce 
Ackerman explicitly adopts the notion that "the Founding" is a temporally-extended 
event in which subsequent occurrences affect (or ought to affect) our understanding of 
the Constitution. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: 
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005). 
44. The fact that many constitutional provisions are written in such general lan-
guage raises questions about Rubenfeld's entire project. Given the presence of at least 
some amendments-the Thirteenth and Fifteenth come immediately to mind-that were 
intended to address certain paradigm cases, slavery, and the disenfranchisement of Afri-
can-Americans, and written in narrow terms targeting those cases, does it follow that all 
constitutional provisions have some historically-discemable irreducible core meaning? 
Or does it follow that we should privilege the cases that may have been on the minds of 
some framers when they crafted very general commitments? 
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understand and interpret paradigm cases or (2) how to divine 
Application Understandings from those cases. 
The construction of proper Application Understandings is 
complicated by the inevitable presence of precedent. In few 
cases will an interpreter be writing on a blank slate, constructing 
Application Understandings from only the historical paradigm 
case itself. Decades-centuries even-of case law will have in-
tervened. Yet Rubenfeld is extremely vague as to how precedent 
affects the construction of Application Understandings. This un-
certainty may explain why it is so difficult to determine how the 
paradigm case method helps to decide cases prospectively, as 
opposed to merely providing a plausible way to harmonize seem-
ingly disparate cases within particular doctrinal lines. 
1. Interpreting the Paradigm Case and Constructing the Ap-
plication Understanding- Determining what a particular para-
digm case "stands for" and, thus, what its proper Application 
Understanding is, seems analogous to determining the holding of 
a case or the proper level of abstraction at which to cast the 
holding of a case. It may in fact be more difficult since, as 
Rubenfeld conceives it, the Application Understanding is a sort 
of least common denominator among the drafters and ratifiers 
(and, perhaps, early interpreters) of constitutional text. At bot-
tom, though, it is an historical inquiry. However, Rubenfeld has 
nothing to say about the methods judges and others should use 
in conducting such an inquiry. One is struck by Revolution by 
Judiciary's lack of interest in history. If one of the chief com-
plaints about originalism is its tendency to produce "law office 
history" or "history lite,"45 it is hard to see how the paradigm 
case method avoids these vices. Historical events are rarely 
monocausal. Even if one cause predominates, or largely causes a 
particular result, can judges be expected to be able to discern 
that cause from the background noise of other contemporary 
forces and settle on the paradigm case?46 
Consider again Rubenfeld's discussion of the commerce 
clause's paradigm case and its Application Understanding men-
tioned earlier. He argues that perhaps the important paradigm 
case of the commerce clause authority concerned empowering 
45. See Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 
95 COLUM. L. REV. 523 (1995). 
46. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Verrneule, Interpretations and Institutions, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 885 (2003) (arguing that many legal theories of interpretation pay in-
sufficient attention to interpreters' institutional competence). 
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Congress to remove obstructions to interstate commerce.47 But, 
as I also noted, his support for this "paradigm case" came much 
later than the Founding Era, in connection with Supreme Court 
cases stating that Congress could exercise its power over inter-
state commerce to reverse a judicial declaration that a state 
structure obstructed commerce.48 Rubenfeld elides these details 
and says that removing obstructions to commerce was a para-
digm case (p. 54). The resulting Application Understanding is 
that the commerce clause authorizes Congress to remove any 
and all barriers to interstate commerce. He then argues that this 
Application Understanding legitimizes Wickard v. Filburn be-
cause Congress, by setting and enforcing quotas for the growing 
of wheat to prop up the market price of wheat, was simply re-
moving an obstacle (low wheat prices) to interstate commerce, 
Q.E.D. (pp. 54-56). 
There is, however, a fair distance between the Court's ac-
quiescence in a congressional declaration that an actual physical 
structure did not pose an obstacle to commerce on a navigable 
waterway and a decision approving a fine for violation of a quota 
designed to prop up farm prices levied on a farmer who grew 
wheat locally and consumed it at home (rather than buying the 
wheat he needed on the market). To say that both involve Con-
gress "removing obstructions to interstate commerce" and are 
thus consistent with the Application Understanding of the com-
merce clause casts that Understanding at a very high level of ab-
straction without defending the propriety of such a loose con-
struction of that Understanding. 
The commerce clause example nicely illustrates another 
problem with Rubenfeld's theory: How does one account for 
precedent in the elaboration of Application Understandings? 
One answer might be that you wouldn't. Rather, in all cases, you 
would start with the constitutional provision, look for the his-
torical paradigm case, and construct an Application Understand-
ing. Intervening cases inconsistent with the Application Under-
standing, one might reason, would represent No-Application 
Understandings one is free to discard, mistaken readings of 
paradigm cases, or failure to follow a proper Application Under-
standing, which ought to be overruled. 
But Rubenfeld is no Clarence Thomas, willing to remake 
doctrine wholesale when doctrine departs from original under-
47. See supra notes 40--43 and accompanying text. 
48. See supra notes 40--43 and accompanying text. 
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standing. Rubenfeld instead seems anxious to fit the Application 
Understandings to doctrine, instead of the other way around. 
Judges, he writes, "interpret constitutional texts in light of their 
paradigm cases; in so doing, they build up the interpretive para-
digms through which the texts are applied. At the same time, 
they lay down new paradigm cases [that] can come to be re-
garded as landmark precedents" (p. 16). 
Later in the book, Rubenfeld criticizes Lawrence v. Texas49 
as being "sadly lacking in terms of constitutional interpretation. 
The absence of paradigm-case reasoning in that opinion is an es-
sential part of the problem" (p. 190). One might argue that 
paradigm-case reasoning is absent because there is no paradigm 
case that was available to the Court.50 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment said nothing about the sort of liberty interest put forward 
by the majority; its own cases, in fact, were quite clear that 
criminalizing sodomy was constitutional. 51 
But Rubenfeld is no Antonin Scalia, either. Lawrence was 
correct, argues Rubenfeld, but the decision was poorly reasoned. 
If the Court wished to ground Lawrence in some sort of "right of 
privacy," he writes, and "if an explanation of privacy is to have 
power in terms of paradigm-case reasoning, it ought both to cap-
ture Roe v. Wade and to draw its principles from the Fourteenth 
Amendment's core applications" (p. 188). At this point one 
might ask how Roe could be a "paradigm case" if Rubenfeld has 
already asserted that the paradigm case of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was the desire to eliminate the Black Codes and the 
resultant Application Understanding either an antidiscrimina-
tion or anticaste principle. 52 
As it happens, even Roe can be explained in terms of the 
elimination of the Black Codes. A "hallmark of female slavery in 
the American South ... was its sexual and maternal component. 
Slave women were routinely forced to have sex, to bear children, 
and to raise children against their will" (p. 188). There is, he 
concludes "no difficulty seeing in Roe v. Wade the proposition 
49. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
50. /d. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lawrence as not having roots in the 
Court's own case law, the text of the Constitution, or history and tradition); Nelson Lund 
& John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555 
(2004) (critiquing Lawrence along the same lines). For a more positive appraisal of Law-
rence and its fidelity to what Rubenfeld would identify as paradigm cases of the Four-
teenth Amendment, see Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: 
Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21. 
51. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
52. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text. 
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that a free woman cannot be forced into motherhood against her 
will" (p. 188).53 This "anti-instrumentalization" principle is at the 
heart of Rubenfeld's account of privacy and one that he finds 
consistent with his amalgamation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's paradigm cases and Application Understandings (p. 188). 
At this point, however, one wonders why one using the 
paradigm-case method would bother with identifying an histori-
cal paradigm case at all. If the goal is, as it seems, to preserve all 
the major cases in a line of doctrine by identifying some principle 
that all share in common, even if it is one that is ahistorical and 
abstract, then there probably isn't a line of doctrine that can't be 
rationalized by clever lawyers. Doctrinal manipulation is some-
thing at which lawyers and judges excel. Even by the generous 
standards of acceptable doctrinal manipulation54 that is the 
stock-in-trade of the "common law" method of constitutional in-
terpretation, Rubenfeld's attempt to use an "anti-
instrumentalization" theory to span the gap between 1868 and 
Roe is a bridge too far. 55 
One is tempted to say that Rubenfeld's anti-
instrumentalization reading of Roe gives away the game. All the 
53. Except that she can, if she attempts to wait until after fetal viability to have an 
abortion, in the absence of a threat to her life or health. See Planned Parenthood of Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) Uoint opinion). 
54. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (striking down 
Connecticut ban on use of contraceptives on grounds it interferes with the privacv rights 
of married persons). with Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113. 153 (1973) (citing, inter alia, Gris-
wold and Eisenstadt and concluding "ftlhis right of privacy, whether it be founded in the 
Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action. 
as we feel it is. or. as the District Court determined. in the Ninth Amendment's reserva-
tion of rights to the people. is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or 
not to terminate her pregnancy."), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If 
the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affect-
ing a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."). As Charles Fried notes, 
individual decisions "may for a time exert their influence in a case-by-case accretion of 
precedents in similar circumstances," but eventually, they will "either run out, or, if po-
tent, they invite courts to move to higher levels of abstraction, where more general 
propositions are announced, and it is these that begin to take over some of the work of 
deciding cases." CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE SUPREME CoURT 189 (2004). This is what happened on the way from Griswold to 
Roe, with Eisenstadt serving as the linchpin. The destination, Fried notes, "is a long way 
from the truly anomalous Connecticut statute in Griswold. Just what authority the Court 
was claiming for itself in Roe v. Wade and in the name of what doctrine is hard to tell." 
/d. at 193. 
55. Cf Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Commentary, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 1639 (1993) (critiquing Akhil Reed Arnar, Comment, The Case of the 
Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992) (offering 
a reading of the First, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments that would permit restric-
tion of "hate speech")). 
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talk of honoring past commitments by identifying and applying 
specific paradigm cases looks like ornamentation designed to ra-
tionalize contemporary results appealing to many law professors. 
Or perhaps it highlights a flawed assumption in Rubenfeld's the-
ory: that constitutional doctrine conforms, generally, to Applica-
tion Understandings of paradigm cases. 56 Beginning with that as-
sumption, or with the related assumption that particular cases 
are rightly decided, would seem to encourage hindsight bias in 
the selection and interpretation of paradigm cases, and in the 
construction and elaboration of Application Understandings. Ei-
ther, it seems to me, compromises the paradigm-case method as 
the method of constitutional interpretation. 
2. Choosing Among Rival Application Understandings-
The difficulty of discerning through time a single cause or case 
that gave rise to constitutional text and reconstructing the mini-
mal commitment or set of commitments framers thought they 
were making through that text is daunting enough. It will fre-
quently happen that the difficulty is compounded because of the 
possibility of rival Application Understandings being created 
from the same historical materials. 
Rubenfeld again has nothing to say about how one is to es-
tablish the Application Understanding of particular provisions 
without wading into historical controversy. His authority for the 
Application Understandings he cites is scant; much of it reads 
like the "every schoolchild knows" type of history. Rubenfeld 
offers those who would use his theory no help in choosing be-
tween two plausible Application Understandings, though consti-
tutional law is replete with such contested understandings. 
Take his example of the First Amendment. He argues that 
its Application Understandings included a prohibition on prior 
restraint and on prosecution for seditious libel (pp. 22-23). He 
alludes to Leonard Levy's argument (p. 23 & p. 208 n.14) that 
the First Amendment was understood by the Framers to bar 
only prior restraint, and not seditious libel, but then dismisses it, 
saying that it became an Application Understanding after the 
1800 election, and writing that "Jefferson's victory is widely re-
garded by contemporary historians as a decisive condemnation 
of the Sedition Act and the prosecutions thereunder," citing 
56. Rubenfeld apparently believes this to be true. He counts "only two areas of 
constitutional doctrine where a foundational Application Understanding could arguably 
be said to have been rejected. The first concerns the contracts clause, the second the dec-
laration-of-war clause." (p. 67). 
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Levy again (p. 24 & p. 208 n.16). He never resolves the founding-
era difference of opinion, but implicitly argues the matter was 
settled by Jefferson's election. He then announces that "[t]oday 
the unconstitutionality of 'seditious libel' laws is a piece of First 
Amendment bedrock, and courts will explicitly say, when they 
declare such laws unconstitutional, that they are honoring the 
First Amendment's historical meaning" (p. 24, footnote omitted). 
Rubenfeld lumps together the establishment and free exer-
cise clauses under the heading "Religious Freedom." Whatever 
else the Framers intended to do, he argues, they meant to bar 
the establishment of a national church and prohibit involuntary 
tax levies to support particular denominations (pp. 30-32). But 
again, this cursory treatment ignores historical controversies 
over matters such as national acknowledgement of religion and 
non-preferential aid to religion- two issues over which the read-
ing of the historical record can yield contradictory answers.57 
Rubenfeld himself acknowledges that "there was no shared 
original understanding about the proper overarching shape of 
church-state relations" other than the Application Understand-
ings he identifies above (p. 30). Given the state of flux over the 
proper relationship he readily concedes, can we be as confident 
in any "set of specific, original, core Application Understand-
ings," much less the ones he offers (p. 30)? 
Another example of Rubenfeld's failure to acknowledge the 
existence of rival Application Understandings, much less provide 
a means for choosing between them, occurs in his discussion of 
the commerce clause. So eager is Rubenfeld to provide a para-
digm case and an Application Understanding that could legiti-
mize Wickard v. Filburn, he largely ignores other possible under-
standings of both the proper paradigm case and the correct 
Application Understanding. 
Rubenfeld acknowledges that the commerce clause gave 
Congress authority over tariffs and interstate commercial trans-
actions and over navigable waterways (p. 54), but is dismissive of 
the notion that the clause is anything other than a power-
57. One need only look at the majority and dissenting opinions in the Supreme 
Court's recent decisions on religious displays and public funding of religious schools to 
get a sense of how very differently the Justices approach such questions. See, e.g., 
McCreary County v. A.C.L.U., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 
2854 (2005); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). Scholars, too, draw radi-
cally different conclusions from the historical materials. Compare PHILIP HAMBURGER, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2002) (concluding separation was probably not 
intended), with LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGIITS 79-102 (1999) 
(arguing for a broad conception of "establishment"). 
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conferring measure. In his discussion of separation of powers, he 
writes that "there does not appear to have been any ... under-
standing" that "the commerce clause would, by its own terms, 
bar states from imposing tariffs on imported goods" (p. 59). 
While "the Constitution was understood to stop states form im-
posing tariffs on interstate commerce . . . the source of that 
paradigmatic prohibition was not the commerce clause" (p. 59). 
Thus he purports to demonstrate the congruence of current un-
derstanding (the commerce clause is not exclusive, barring any 
state regulation of interstate commerce) with the paradigm case 
resulting in the commerce clause. 
There are several problems here. First, Rubenfeld is on 
shaky ground when he concludes that the commerce clause was 
understood to have little to say about state taxation and regula-
tion of interstate commerce. As Albert Abel concluded over a 
half-century ago, Madison was largely correct when he described 
the commerce clause as designed primarily to restrain states.58 
Examining the debates from Philadelphia, as well as those in 
state ratifying conventions and in some published commentary, 
Abel showed that to the extent that the commerce clause was 
mentioned at all, it was mentioned in connection with restraining 
states. When the affirmative power of Congress was discussed, 
most commentators mentioned little more than Congress passing 
navigation acts controlling the import and export of goods into 
the country.59 Abel's conclusion was that, to the extent an origi-
nal understanding could be discerned, the scope of affirmative 
federal power granted by the commerce clause-as opposed to 
the restraint that it imposed on the states- was small indeed. 60 
My own research61 confirms that of Abel. The Framers were 
concerned about interstate commercial discrimination, whose 
presence they attributed in part to a lack of centralized authority 
over interstate commerce. They assumed, without addressing the 
details of operation, that the commerce clause on its own, at least 
in part, removed certain commercial matters from the sphere of 
state competence. While the commerce clause was not the only 
provision addressed to restricting state power over commerce, it 
58. See Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and 
in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432,469 (1941). 
59. I d. at 470--73. 
60. !d. at 475. 
61. Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-era Discrimination Against Interstate 
Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 94 KY. L.J. 37 
(2005-2006). 
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was thought to play a role. Chief Justice Marshall famously re-
marked in Gibbons v. Ogden that he leaned toward that interpre-
tation;62 his colleague William Johnson embraced it. 63 As late as 
the mid-nineteenth century, the Court was still wrestling with the 
exclusivity/nonexclusivity question when rookie Justice Benjamin 
Curtis cut the Gordian Knot and proclaimed that the clause was 
exclusive with regard to "national" subjects, but not exclusive 
when "local" subjects were being addressed.64 
Finally, consider the Second Amendment, an example 
Rubenfeld does not use, but which would seem an excellent can-
didate for application of his theory. Among scholars, there are 
few more bitterly contested questions in contemporary constitu-
tional law than the scope of the Second Amendment.65 If one 
was to use Rubenfeld's theory to interpret the Amendment in 
light of a hypothetical federal gun control ordinance, then the 
accurate description of the paradigm case and the Application 
Understanding is of crucial importance. Here again there are 
competing models. One reading of the amendment, dubbed the 
"Standard Model" by Glenn Reynolds,66 posits that the Applica-
tion Understanding was that the Amendment prohibited Con-
gress from regulating privately-owned firearms to the extent 
they would be unavailable for individual or collective self-
defense.67 Even Standard Modelers, however, might differ on the 
precise point at which governmental regulation would become 
an infringement on the right to keep and bear arms. 
Others, however, argue that that Standard Model is incor-
rect; they contend that the correct Application Understanding of 
the Second Amendment was that it prohibited Congress from 
disarming or abrogating state militia, which were intended to be 
62. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
63. ld. at 222-39 (Johnson, J. concurring). See generally Norman R. Williams, Gib-
bons, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1398 (2004). 
64. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851). 
65. U.S. CONST. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia being necessary to the secu-
rity of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be in-
fringed."). 
66. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 TENN. 
L. REV. 461, 464--71 (1995) (describing the "Standard Model of the Second Amend-
ment"). The contemporary status of the debate is nicely captured in Stuart Banner, The 
Second Amendment, So Far, 117 HARV. L. REV. 898 (2003) (reviewing DAVID C. 
WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: TAMING 
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003)). 
67. See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 66, at 475-88 (summarizing the scope of the 
Standard Model); see also Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original 
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 257-fJ7 (1983) (sketching an 
individual rights model of the Second Amendment). 
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the cornerstone of national defense.68 This reading would leave 
private ownership of firearms wide open for governmental regu-
lation. To the extent that the militia-as originally understood 
by the Framers-has disappeared as an institution, the Amend-
ment mi&ht even have long ago ceased to have any enforceable 
content. There is little, if any, middle ground between the con-
tending positions. 70 
The choice of contending Application Understandings is the 
choice between casting the Second Amendment as a potentially 
robust individual right or as a constitutional anachronism, de-
void of any contemporary relevance much less any judicially-
enforceable content. It is striking, given how much rides on the 
choice of Application Understandings and the prevalence of 
controversies over the scope of the commitments made in the 
Constitution, that Rubenfeld has so little to say over how to 
choose among competing Application Understandings when he 
emphasizes that "constitutional provisions have core, historical 
meanings, impervious or almost impervious to judicial rewriting, 
given by the concrete political battles fought and won ... in the 
nation's revolutionary past" (p. 17). Deciding what those "core, 
historical meanings" are, in fact, seems to lie at the heart of his 
project. His failure to engage the issue represents another crucial 
omission in his theory. 
The point is not whether Levy, Abel and I, or the Standard 
Modelers, on the one hand, or Rubenfeld or anti-individual 
rights interpreters of the Second Amendment, on the other, are 
correct. Rather, the point is that there are competing paradigm 
cases and thus, competing Application Understandings for many 
(perhaps most) important constitutional provisions. What is sur-
prising is not so much that Rubenfeld has a version of constitu-
tional history that he thinks correct, but rather that he barely ac-
knowledges the existence of respectable differences of opinion, 
much less defends his version against viable competitors or of-
fers guidelines for selecting among them. 
68. For a collection of anti·individual rights views on the Second Amendment, see 
Symposium, The Second Amendment: Fresh Looks, 76 CHI.·KENT L. REV. 3 (2000); see 
also WILLIAMS, supra note 66. A critical take on the "collective rights" interpretation is 
found in Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' 
Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737 (1995). 
69. See WILLIAMS, supra note 66, at 69-96. 
70. But see Laurence H. Tribe & Akhil Reed Amar, Well Regulated Militias, and 
More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at A31 (arguing that Second Amendment guarantees 
individual right, but that right, like all rights, is subject to reasonable regulation). 
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It is clear that Rubenfeld is not so much concerned with 
American Historical Association-approved historical accuracy71 
as with what another informed commentator might term the 
"truthiness"72 of his constitutional history. Rubenfeld seeks an 
account of history that calibrates current doctrine with Applica-
tion Understandings. No matter how incomprehensible doctrine 
appears, Rubenfeld argues, it just so happens that the Supreme 
Court regularly keeps faith with constitutional Application Un-
derstandings. But this introduces the possibility of bias. Given 
the choice of plausible accounts of constitutional texts, the 
"right" one, from Rubenfeld's perspective, is the one that will 
validate the course the Court subsequently took. But in what 
sense can the Court (or Rubenfeld) truly be said to be honoring 
the Constitution's deep commitments unless one is prepared to 
argue that the Court, despite doctrinal twists and turns, always 
ends up on the side of constitutional commitment, with time 
winnowing out No-Application Understandings? Perhaps that 
could be proven empirically, but Rubenfeld's selective survey of 
doctrine doesn't carry the burden of persuasion. 
C. PROSPECfiVE APPLICATION OF PARADIGM CASES 
Earlier I discussed the difficulty of constructing an appro-
priate Application Understanding from individual paradigm 
cases. As one looks to apply the paradigm-case method prospec-
tively, a related problem appears. How does one fashion rules 
from an Application Understanding or a set of related Applica-
tion Understandings (or from their antecedent paradigm cases) 
for use in similar, but not identical, cases arising in the future? 
Rubenfeld explicitly disclaims any attempt "to say here how 
courts go about the business of extrapolating rules or principles 
from paradigm cases" (p. 123). The only hint comes earlier, 
when he writes that ''[r]easoning from paradigm cases is a varie-
gated business-incorporating considerations of text, policy, and 
justice; requiring ineluctably normative, even ideological judg-
71. He makes clear at several points that his methodology is concerned with some-
thing deeper than mere "original intent;" he aims to get at the core commitments of the 
Framers-even, apparently, if they were unaware of the depth of their commitment. See 
p. 106 (contrasting commitmentarianism with original intent). . 
72. Truthiness is the quality by which a person purports to know somethmg 
emotionally or instinctively, without regard to evidence or to what the 
person might conclude from intellectual examination. Stephen Colbert 
coined this definition of the word during the first episode (October 17, 
2005) of his satirical television program The Colbert Report, as the subject 
of a segment called "The Wl')rd." 
Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki!fruthiness (last visited Jun. 30, 2006). 
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ment- but it is the primary business of constitutional interpreta-
tion" (p. 16). 
If he is not going to give us explicit direction as to how to do 
this, how can we ascertain whether it is being done well or 
poorly? Only in a final, brief chapter does he look at the Court's 
current jurisprudence in a few areas and assess it in light of the 
paradigm case method. There, he offers a peek at the paradigm-
case method's operation by analyzing recent Court decisions on 
privacy, congressional power under the commerce clause, and 
affirmative action; the results serve largely to reinforce the fore-
going criticisms. 
1. Lawrence and the Right of Privacy-As noted earlier, 
Rubenfeld criticizes the Court's recent decision in Lawrence as 
an unsatisfying example of constitutional interpretation in gen-
eral and its failure to shore up its holding "by paradigm-case rea-
soning" (p. 184). Rubenfeld is skeptical that, by holding Texas 
had no legitimate governmental interest in prohibiting homo-
sexual sodomy based on its citizens' moral disapproval, the 
Court truly intended to construct a new paradigm for privacy 
cases around the notion that states may not legislate for moral 
reasons (pp. 185-86). 
If it did, Rubenfeld continues, it failed to include paradigm 
cases to support the Court's decision. "The Lawrence opinion," 
he writes, "presents itself as an interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but one searches that opinion in vain for any sign 
of an interpretive engagement with the text of that amendment 
or its paradigm cases" (p. 186). This is a curious criticism be-
cause Rubenfeld then declares that Roe v. Wade73 is "one para-
digm case most associated with, and most definitive of, the right 
of privacy" but that Lawrence's putative "no-legislating-morality 
principle" doesn't encompass Roe (pp. 186--87). But Roe, like 
Lawrence, represented a marked departure from prior cases it-
self. One searches Roe in vain for paradigm cases. In fact, Roe is 
notorious for its studied indifference to the constitutional 
source-text, history, paradigm case, or what have you-of the 
fundamental right it declared.74 
Rubenfeld offers one, though. Roe, he argues, is consistent 
with an "anti-instrumentalization" principle he derives from an 
73. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
74. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf' A Comment on Roe v. 
Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 947 (1973) (complaining that Roe "is not constitutional law and 
gives almost no sense of an obligation to try to be"). 
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aspect of the anti-discrimination paradigm case of the Four-
teenth Amendment: prohibiting the forced childbearing endured 
by female slaves. This paradigm case, for which he offers no his-
torical evidence, I have already criticized.75 I cite it again, how-
ever, to highlight the difficulty one would have in applying his 
method prospectively. The anti-instrumentalization principle's 
constitutional pedigree is no better than, and the principle itself 
is at least as malleable and difficult to apply as, the putative "no-
legislating-morality" principle of Lawrence. 
Rubenfeld is surely correct "that American constitutional 
jurisprudence has never embraced the principle that government 
may not 'legislate morality'" (p. 189). But, at least as Rubenfeld 
seems to use it-as a principle that "condemn(s] all state efforts 
to force particular occupations on individuals, or otherwise to in-
strumentalize them as masters could do to their slaves" 
(p. 188)-I'm doubtful our jurisprudence has ever embraced the 
anti-instrumentalization principle either. The draft, for example, 
stands as a glaring exception;7 so, too, perhaps do laws mandat-
ing school attendance or compulsory vaccination. And let us not 
forget that the U.S. Supreme Court has also countenanced the 
forced sterilization of the "feeble-minded. "77 Perhaps I have 
misunderstood Rubenfeld's use of the term "instrumentaliza-
tion," but he fails to provide a more detailed definition. 
2. Lopez, Morrison, and the Commerce Clause- Rubenfeld 
also criticizes the Court's (perhaps shortlived78 ) attempt in 
United States v. Lopez79 and United States v. Morrison 80 to im-
pose limits on Congress's commerce power as inconsistent with 
the commerce clause's paradigm case (p. 191). Returning to his 
assertion (hedged here) that preventing obstructions to inter-
state commerce was a "very early and probably foundational ap-
plication" of the commerce clause (p. 191, emphasis added), 
Rubenfeld dismisses Lopez and Morrison's concern with the 
presence or absence of economic activity before sanctioning the 
regulation of intrastate activities substantially affecting interstate 
commerce. 81 According to Rubenfeld, "in this paradigm case 
75. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
76. See The Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (upholding the 
constitutionality of conscription). 
77. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927). 
78. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
79. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
80. 529 u.s. 598 (2000). 
81. See id. at 610 (calling the economic/non-economic distinction "central" to the 
decision in Lopez). 
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[i.e., removing obstructions to interstate commerce], Congress's 
power arises from the effect on interstate commerce, not from 
the notion that the bridge was itself 'economic in nature' (which 
it may or may not have been)" (p. 191). Thus, "Congress clearly 
acts within its commerce power when it regulates in-state activity 
to eliminate injuries to interstate or international commerce" 
(p. 193). He goes on to propose an intent test for the commerce 
clause: Congress can "indeed potentially reach virtually all activ-
ity under the commerce clause, but only so long as that activity 
threatens adverse effects on commerce and only to the extent 
that Congress is genuinely seeking to redress those effects" 
(p. 193). 
The criticism of Lopez and Morrison is ironic given 
Rubenfeld's earlier concern with having Application Under-
standings incorporate and reflect subsequent precedent. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Lopez may be criticized on a 
number of grounds, but it was an impressive attempt at synthesis 
that incorporated existing case law without surrendering the 
premise that there were judicially enforceable limits on congres-
sional power. 
Rubenfeld's criticism also belies a lack of sensitivity to the 
test that Lopez and Morrison actually produced. The Court 
readily conceded that Congress has (and has had for nearly a 
century) power over the channels of interstate commerce, in-
cluding people and things moving therein, as well as power to 
regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce.82 This power 
exists regardless of the reason for the regulation, and without re-
gard to whether the channel or instrumentality was located in a 
single state. This power, moreover, results from a straightfor-
ward reading of the commerce clause and the necessary and 
proper clause. Thus, Lopez and Morrison's tripartite divisions of 
congressional authority-two of which in no way depend on the 
commercial or economic nature of the regulated activity-neatly 
reflect what Rubenfeld regards as a paradigm case, without the 
problems endemic to the purpose-based inquiry he proposes.83 
82. See id. at 608-09; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. 
83. Rubenfeld concedes that "[n]otwithstanding the Lopez rule," Congress could 
prohibit construction of a bridge under its power to regulate the channels of interstate 
commerce. (p. 231 n.7). Yet he complains that "the Lopez rule misunderstands the 
circumstances in which an effect on commerce justifies an exercise of Congress' 
commerce clause power." !d. Shortly thereafter he writes that "[t]he absence of a 
purpose-based limitation explains what is wrong with both the Lopez Court's economic-
activity rule and its exemption for laws regulating the 'use of the channels' of interstate 
commerce .... " (p. 231 n.lO). As an example, he offers a law prohibiting persons entering 
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Were Rubenfeld's purpose-base test adopted, it would seem 
to reverse at least a century's worth of precedent. For example, 
it is difficult to see what harm to interstate commerce is pro-
duced by child labor, convict-produced goods, and the like. The 
ban on goods produced by children was undertaken to right what 
was seen as a moral wrong when it was first proposed in 1907, 
not to protect commerce from some harm; a version barring 
from interstate commerce goods produced by child labor was fi-
nally signed by President Wilson in 1916.84 It was precisely on 
the grounds that Rubenfeld seems to advocate-that the regula-
tion was not of harmful goods, but was instead a pretext-that 
the Supreme Court struck down the ban in Hammer v. Dagen-
hart.85 A decade earlier, dissenters complained that the ban of 
lottery tickets upheld in Champion v. Amei6 did not involve in-
terstate commerce at all, but reflected an attempt by Congress to 
exercise a police power that the Constitution denied to it. 87 Not 
even Justice Thomas denies Congress's power to regulate the 
into same-sex marriages from using waterways or airways. Such a law 
would be a regulation of the use of the channels of interstate commerce, but it 
would not be a valid exercise of the commerce power-precisely because its 
purpose was not genuinely commercial or economic in nature. Conversely, a 
law prohibiting the noncommercial transport of dangerous explosives on 
airplanes is a valid exercise of the commerce power-not because the activity 
regulated is 'economic in nature,' and not because a 'channel' of commerce is 
involved, but because the law is clearly aimed at preventing harm to interstate 
commerce .... 
!d. Considering the "channels" and "instrumentalities" to be "exceptions" to the "Lopez 
rule" reflects a curious reading of that case. Rubenfeld does not seem to appreciate that 
all three categories result in large part from the combination of the commerce power and 
the necessary and proper clause. 
84. For the background of the child labor law and the ensuing litigation, see 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL & BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., 9 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 
1910-1921, at 447-59 (1984). 
85. 247 U.S. 251, 271-72 (1918). The Court wrote that "[t]he thing intended to be 
accomplished by this statute is the denial of the facilities of interstate commerce to those 
manufacturers in the States who employ children within the prohibited ages. The act in 
its effect does not regulate transportation among the States, but aims to standardize the 
ages at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the States." 
Jd. Later, the Court argued that "[t]he grant of power of Congress over the subject of 
interstate commerce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it au-
thority to control the states in their exercise of the police power over local trade and 
manufacture." !d. at 273-74. 
86. 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
87. See icL at 364-73 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting); ALFRED H. KELLY & WINFRED A. 
HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 587-88 
(3d ed. 1963) ("Chief Justice Fuller's dissent ... centered on the intent or purpose behind 
the law. The real purpose of the statute, according to Fuller, was not the regulation of 
commerce but the suppression of lotteries. The measure therefore constituted a clear 
invasion of the police powers of the states under the pretense of regulating interstate 
commerce."). 
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channels of interstate commerce, including persons and things 
moving therein. 88 
Rubenfeld does suggest that "it may be that Congress ought 
to have power to redress not only potential harms to commerce 
but also potential harms caused by commerce," like "environ-
mental degradation" (p. 195). Presumably this could include 
harms caused to children by permitting a market for goods pro-
duced by child labor to exist. But this seems not only to range far 
beyond the paradigm case of obstructing commerce but also to 
remove any limits that his purpose-based inquiry places on con-
. 1 89 gresswna power. 
In addition, Rubenfeld never explains how the Court is to 
conduct its purpose-based inquiry. How can courts accurately 
gauge whether a particular law is pretextual? Conflicts will inevi-
tably arise over the "purpose" of a law. When they do, must the 
Court defer to Congress's statement of its purpose? Search for 
the "actual" purpose?9° Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in 
McCulloch cautioned Congress that pretextual invocations of 
the necessary and proper clause would result in judicial invalida-
tion.91 Yet the Supreme Court has not made Marshall's admoni-
tion a robust restriction on congressional power.92 
88. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2229-30 (2005) (Thomas, J. dissent· 
in g). 
89. For the Hammer Court's response to a similar argument-that the child labor 
law was needed to prevent unfair competition between states banning child labor and 
those permitting it, see Hammer, 247 U.S. at 273-74 (arguing that "[t]herc is no power 
vested in Congress to require the states to exercise their police power so as to prevent 
possible unfair competition. Many causes may co-operate to give one state, by reason of 
local laws or conditions, an economic advantage over others. The commerce clause was 
not intended to give to Congress a general authority to equalize such conditions" and 
concluding that "[t]he grant of power of Congress over the subject of interstate com-
merce was to enable it to regulate such commerce, and not to give it authority to control 
the states in their exercise of the police power over local trade and manufacture"). 
90. Compare United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (holding 
that rational basis review requires the Court to take as the "end" of Congress its stated 
purpose when assessing rationality of means), with id. at 187 (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Court should have ascertained Congress' "actual" purpose in order to 
measure the rationality of means against legislative ends). For a brief, yet insightful dis-
cussion of the problem with looking for legislative purpose, see JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 125-31 (1980). 
91. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,423 (1819) ("Should Congress, 
in the execution of its powers, adopt measures which are prohibited by the constitution; 
or should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accom-
plishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty 
of this tribunal, should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that such an 
act was not the law of the land."). 
92. Compare Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) (characterizing 
McCulloch as having "establish[ed] review for means-ends rationality under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause"), with id. at 611 (Thomas, 1., concurring) (criticizing the major-
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When Marshall later tried to use a purpose-based test to dis-
tinguish permissible and impermissible state regulations of inter-
state commerce, it became apparent that a single law can par-
take of both categories.93 A congressional statute could be both 
an attempt to remove a commercial obstruction and largely ad-
dressed to some problem ancillary to its effects on interstate 
commerce. Without a rule for distinguishing pure anti-
obstruction or anti-harm legislation from pretextual ones, courts 
will either underenforce the clause by deferring to Congress or 
will risk its wrath by second-guessing congressional policy 
choices. 
3. Grutter, Gratz, and Affirmative Action-Finally, the 
Court's recent affirmative action cases94 receive some rough 
treatment from Rubenfeld. The result, of course, does not-
Rubenfeld approves of the fact that the Court stepped away 
from Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena's95 rigorous application 
of strict scrutiny, at least in an educational setting.96 But it is only 
in spite of the Court's prior decisions, argues Rubenfeld, that the 
Court reached the correct decision in Grutter and Gratz (p. 196). 
When the Court settled on strict scrutiny as the proper 
standard of review for classifications involving race,97 many un-
derstood the Court to be embracing Justice Harlan's "color-
blind" theory of the Fourteenth Amendment.98 Rubenfeld con-
cedes "it is possible in theory to derive either an anti-caste prin-
ciple of the kind that tolerates affirmative action or a color-
ity opinion for its apparent holding "that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes the 
exercise of any power that is no more than a 'rational means' to effectuate one of Con-
gress' enumerated powers"). 
93. Initially, the line Marshall drew between permissible and impermissible state 
regulations of interstate commerce depended on whether the state statute was intended 
to be an exercise of the state's police power or whether it regulated interstate commerce 
qua commerce. Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245,252 (1829). 
94. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
95. 515 u.s. 200 (1995). 
96. P. 201 ("[T]he Grutter Court was right to back away from a strict implementa-
tion of the strict-scrutiny regime announced in Adarand."). 
97. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 221-22; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Inc., 488 U.S. 
469, 493 (1989) (identifying strict scrutiny as the proper standard of review). 
98. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[I]n view 
of the constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, 
ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our constitution is color-blind, and neither 
knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal 
before the law."). For articles identifying Adarand with the "color-blind" interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, see, for example, Koteles Alexander, Adarand: Brute 
Political Force Concealed as a Constitutional Colorblind Principle, 39 How. L.J. 367 
(1995); Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance 
of Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673 (1996). 
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blindness principle that cuts against it" from "the Fourteenth 
Amendment's paradigm cases" (p. 196). But, he continues, 
adopting a color-blind theory produces what he perceives to be 
intolerably anomalous results: Many groups, under current con-
stitutional doctrine, are both protected from discrimination and 
may be singled out for beneficial treatment.99 Thus, "color 
blindness puts racial minorities in a worse position than that of 
other minorities under existing equal protection law" (p. 197). 
Here Rubenfeld has a point worth considering. If the Four-
teenth Amendment was meant to aid newly-freed slaves, it 
seems odd to both ban discrimination against that group and bar 
efforts to remedy the effects of their enslavement and subse-
quent legal subordination. It is also odd that the Court's two 
originalists-Justices Thomas and Scalia-do not seem the least 
bit interested in the attitude the Reconstruction Congress had 
towards what we might now call racial preferences (pp. 196-97). 
But the shortcomings of Rubenfeld's paradigm case method all 
come together in this final example. 
First, Rubenfeld's own distinction between commitments 
and intentions might be turned against his argument. Sure, fram-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment likely intended to permit 
beneficial legislation to aid African-Americans transition from 
bondage to freedom, but their intentions cannot be considered 
more than a No-Application Understanding, given their failure 
to sanctify that intention in the Fourteenth Amendment's equal-
ity commitment. Thus, Adarand was entirely correct to discard 
that No-Application Understanding in favor of the no-
discrimination Application Understanding. The commitment 
made to color-blindness perhaps operates in a more unyielding 
fashion than it was originally intended, but as Rubenfeld points 
out earlier, we undertake commitments without being able to 
foresee what living up to those commitments will require of us in 
the future (pp. 75-76). 
There are other problems, too. The inability to resolve the 
anti-caste/anti-discrimination interpretation suggests the impor-
tance-and the difficulty-of correctly framing the paradigm 
case and constructing the proper Application Understanding. It 
99. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) 
(striking down a special use permit for a home for the mentally retarded); United States 
Dept. Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating a restriction on a food stamp 
program limiting the program to households composed of related persons). 
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highlights the failure of Rubenfeld's theory to provide a means 
of choosing between two plausible Understandings. 
In the case of affirmative action, Rubenfeld tries to resolve 
the dilemma by pointing out that one theory-the anti-caste 
principle-produces fewer doctrinal anomalies (pp. 197-201). 
But to resolve disputes over paradigm cases by choosing the one 
that causes the least doctrinal disruption again highlights the un-
certain role of precedent in his constitutional theory. Does 
Rubenfeld truly think that the Court rarely strays from Applica-
tion Understandings and thus its doctrine, however it develops, 
largely reflects that fidelity? Or does he just think that, cetus 
paribus, in choosing paradigm cases and Application Under-
standings, one should endeavor to incorporate as much existing 
doctrine as possible? The former seems implausible. The latter 
would seem to undermine the distinction that he makes between 
his theory and other non-originalist theories of interpretation-
that his theory honors and attempts to remain faithful to historic 
commitments made in the past and written into the Constitution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Rubenfeld's interest in grounding Supreme Court decision-
making in text and history is admirable. (It also suggests the de-
gree to which, in fact, proponents of originalism triumphed. It is 
hard to imagine Revolution by Judiciary being written thirty or 
forty years ago.) But Rubenfeld's professed concern that inter-
pretive theory honor the past is undermined by his other con-
cerns: the preservation of particular Supreme Court cases like 
Roe; lines of doctrine like the post-New Deal commerce clause 
decisions; and the defense of controversial new cases like Law-
rence and Grutter. The result, in the paradigm-case method, 
seems to combine the rootlessness and mutability of non-
originalist interpretive theories, like Dworkin's "law-as-
integrity" theory, with a superficial historicism indistinguishable 
from the "law office history" that sets professional historians' 
teeth on edge. Like many "third-way" theories, the paradigm-
case method seems to combine the worst aspects of the theories 
to which it presents itself as an alternative. It seeks legitimacy in 
history and text without being willing to subordinate particular 
cases-or, indeed, judicial decisionmaking generally-to the dis-
cipline of either. When the historical ornamentation is stripped 
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away, the paradigm-case method seems little more than a ver-
sion of common law constitutional interpretation. 100 
The questions critics101 raised about the early version of the 
paradigm-case method presented in Freedom and Time are still 
present at the end of Revolution by Judiciary. If the paradigm-
case method is to win an audience, it appears that another book 
will have to be written. 102 In his next book, Rubenfeld should 
give a better account of how paradigm cases and Application 
Understandings are to be derived. He should provide criteria for 
choosing among competing Application Understandings. He 
should provide guidance for applying Application Understand-
100. See generally David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996). 
101. Erwin Chemerinsky, for example, called the description of the paradigm-case 
method "sketchy" and complained that "Rubenfeld never explains how a court is to de-
termine the paradigm case for a particular constitutional provision. Equally important, 
Rubenfeld never explains the appropriate level of abstraction to use in stating a para-
digm case." Chemerinsky, supra note 14, at 1261. How, he also asks, "is the choice to be 
made as to which is the better 'paradigm case?' Rubenfeld never explains. Nor is there 
any explanation as to how courts are to use the paradigm case method, even assuming 
that a paradigm case can be discerned." /d. "Absent any description of how to derive and 
assess a paradigm case," he concluded, "Rubenfeld's approach adds little except a new 
phrase." /d. at 1262. 
Mike Gerhardt's review, which also used "sketchy" to describe the paradigm-case 
method, Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 324, echoed Chemerinsky's concerns. 
Once the Court constructs the "foundational paradigm," the next few steps are 
unclear. Presumably, the authority of a foundational paradigm derives from its 
consistency or conformity with the basic purpose of a constitutional guarantee. 
A paradigm is binding to the extent it has accurately captured the central com-
mitment or purpose underlying a particular constitutional guarantee .... Yet, 
the methodology as described does not indicate where or how anything other 
than the written-ness of the Constitution, such as constitutional structure or the 
actual inscriptions of the Constitution, matter to the explication of a constitu-
tional guarantee or prohibition .... Nor is it clear how one should move from 
"the foundational paradigm" to further explication of it. Why not stop once you 
have identified the foundational paradigm (as would apparently be the case 
with originalism)? It is not clear what else compels the next move . 
. . . [T]he challenge of the paradigm case method is to capture precisely the 
central commitment underlying a constitutional guarantee in conformity with 
the historical struggle giving rise to it and not the interpreter's subjective pref-
erences .... However, the paradigm case method provides no guidance on how 
to sort out coinciding, overlapping, arguably conflicting, or multiple purposes. 
Moreover, the paradigm case method seems to ignore the likelihood that a 
given text reflects a compromise among those who drafted it; merely assigning a 
single paradigm to a particular text has the effect of unraveling the compromise 
and arbitrarily declaring one constituency victorious. 
A further difficulty with the paradigm case method is Rubenfeld's sugges-
tion that in fact the Court has largely adopted the paradigm case method in al-
most every setting, with the sole exception of affirmative action. 
/d. at 324-25. 
102. But see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPARATELY SEEKING 
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002) 
(criticizing top-down foundational theories of constitutional interpretation). 
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ings prospectively. He would do well to abandon the assumption 
that the Supreme Court nearly always preserves Application 
Understandings and discards No-Application Understandings, 
with the consequence that cases and lines of doctrine must be 
preserved. In addition, Rubenfeld should address the institu-
tional competence of judges to perform the intellectual heavy-
lifting that the paradigm-case method seems to entail if it is to be 
performed well. 103 
103. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (faulting much contempo-
rary constitutional theory for failing to consider the institutional competencies of inter-
preters). 
